A tactical retreat? Conceptualising the dynamics European grocery retail divestment from East Asia.
Introduction
In the academic literature on retailing, internationalisation is commonly portrayed as an attractive strategic option for the firm. As the globalisation of the retail industry continues apace, the focus of research has been on identifying the critical success factors and key competencies that allow retailers to successfully embed themselves in local markets. However, at the level of the individual firm, retail internationalisation is in a constant state of flux, with divestment and re-adjustment of international portfolios a common feature.
In our efforts to theorise the retail internationalisation process, the emphasis has been on market entry and expansion, rather than on withdrawal and divestment. Within the existing literature we have tended to simply identify and categorise the generic pressures that lead to divestment, rather than explore the changing interactions between these factors and the firm. The need for a broader conceptualisation of the divestment process, and one which recognises the changing dynamics between the different factors driving exit decisions over time, presents a gap in our current understanding.
In this paper, we aim to address this gap in our knowledge. We do this by examining the patterns of investment and divestment by European grocery retailers in East Asia over the past thirty years. During this period, thirteen of Europe's leading grocery retailers entered eleven different countries in the region. Once viewed as highly attractive retail markets with great potential for future growth, recent high-profile withdrawals raise questions about this strategy and future investment. We focus on market withdrawals and the underlying rationale(s) provided for these actions at the time. Assessment of these patterns and pressures allows us to identify how the evolving intersection of home and host market dynamics influence the decision making of retail firms.
The paper is organised as follows. First, we provide a brief review of the literature on international retail divestment to identify the gaps in our current understanding that we seek to address. We then explain the approach and sources used in our investigation.
Patterns of entry, in-country investment and market withdrawal are explored to set the context for the main contribution of the paper, which considers retrenchment and divestment activities over the study period and their relationship with the wider operational environment in more detail. Benito and Welch (1997: 9) define international divestment as "voluntary or forced actions that reduce a company's engagement in or exposure to cross-border activities". Benito (2005: 247) further concludes that: "Divestments are an integral part of business. They can be seen as the results of ever-evolving processes of change that keep companies and whole economies rejuvenated and in shape". Retailing is no different from any other economic sector in this respect. Several frameworks for explaining international retail divestment have emerged in the literature. Drawing on perspectives originally devised for manufacturing (for example Tornedon, 1975; Boddewyn, 1983 Boddewyn, , 1985 Benito, 1997 Benito, , 2005 , these have then been adapted to the specificities of the retail sector.
Literature Review
International divestment research has sought to establish the reasons for failure (why) and the process of divestment (how). Boddewyn (1983 Boddewyn ( , 1985 distinguished between the conditions, motives and the precipitating circumstances which provide the trigger(s) for divestment. Common contributing factors included the stability and predictability of the host environment, operational performance (both internationally and domestically), the strategic fit of the foreign operation, senior management changes, and governance issues. The relative emphasis placed on these criteria is in part determined by the choice of an underlying conceptual perspective (Benito & Welch, 1997) . The economic perspective views divestment as a reaction to changing economic conditions which impact on financial performance, the strategic management perspective regards divestment as a part of a fluid portfolio of activities responding to life cycle considerations, and the internationalisation management perspective highlights the barriers to withdrawal arising from inertia generated by the firm's level of international commitment and length of time in the market. These different perspectives provide an underlying conceptual position with respect to divestment, but are assumed to be static and there is no consideration of if these positions evolve and change over time.
This emphasis on establishing motives and mechanisms also underpins work in the retail sector. Burt et al. (2003) categorised international divestment in retailing as failure, defined as the unplanned underperformance of a firm, arising from four interlinked sources. First, market failure occurs when the market does not 'behave' as expected and consequently projections of market growth and profitability are not met.
Changes in economic, political, regulatory and social conditions create a level of market instability impairing performance. Second, competitive failure arises when operational performance does not match that of local competitors or competitors react and compete more effectively than anticipated. Third, operational failure relates to the transferability of the domestic business model and ways of operating, and occurs when domestic skills, concepts and managerial approaches integral to the business model do not fit well in the host market environment or are resisted by key stakeholders.
Finally, business failure can be diagnosed when decisions impacting upon the international business are made because of changing circumstances (performance, stakeholder expectations etc.) within the wider organisation. These circumstances may arise in the domestic business and\or in other international operations.
While the subsequent closure of stores or country exit is commonly regarded as 'failure', divestment may also be a positive strategic action. Alexander and Quinn (2002: 121) emphasised that divestment does not always reflect an inherent weakness on the part of the international retailer, and may occur for other strategic reasons: "it is easier to divest international operations than it is for an international company to divest domestic operations when trading conditions are poor". Palmer (2004) framed divestment within a broader context of four pro-active modes of organisational restructuring: financial restructuring, relating to changes in governance structures and stakeholder expectations; portfolio restructuring, arising from merger and acquisition activity and alliances or joint ventures; organisational restructuring, reflecting changes in company structure, processes or management; and spatial restructuring, requiring changes in the geographical scope and scale of activity. Finally, Cairns et al. (2008 Cairns et al. ( , 2010 also distinguished between 'corporate crisis' divestment -characterised by a lack of stability or focus amongst leadership and problems away from the host market which stimulate a need to refocus on the domestic market -and 'positive restructuring' divestment characterised as an ongoing process of revitalisation and renewal through organisational learning which may lead to new formats or approaches better suited to internationalisation.
Empirical research into international retail divestment has explored these themes.
Although retail divestments were noted in some studies exploring the overall patterns of internationalisation activity (Hollander, 1970; Burt, 1993; Knee, 1993; Godley & Fletcher, 2001 ) it was not until the mid-2000s that divestment became a significant focus of empirical work. In the European grocery sector, for instance, Burt et al. (2004) examined divestment activity from 1970 , while Alexander et al. (2005 explored divestment in several sectors over the 1987-2003 period. These macro level studies found that: international retail divestment took several forms, although country exit dominated; different divestment and exit rates were found for different countries and regions; and most divestments were relatively small scale (less than 40 stores) and occurred within 10 years of entry. Sector level reviews have been supported by more interpretive case studies, typically focussing on specific divestment incidents, for example, Marks and Spencer (Burt et al., 2002; Jackson et al., 2005; Mellahi et al., 2002) , Tesco (Palmer, 2004; , Home Depot (Bianchi & Arnold, 2004) , Sainsbury (El-Amir & Burt, 2007) , Ahold (Wrigley & Currah, 2003; Palmer & Quinn, 2007) , Wal-Mart (Christopherson, 2007; Kim, 2008; and Gandolfi & Strach, 2009), Aldi (Sikordili, 2013) and Target (Yoder et al., 2016) .
The triggers for divestment and the processes of divestment in international retailing are therefore multi-faceted. Whilst a range of contributing factors and options are identified in existing frameworks, these are largely static representations. The focus on individual divestment incidents tends to highlight specific circumstances at a single point in time. We therefore contend that this leaves gaps in our understanding. First, the emphasis tends to be on a specific trigger or set of triggers and the response this generates (i.e. divestment activity). The wider environmental setting and institutional context, including both domestic and host market factors, is often underplayed and the complexity of interactions and relationships between these factors and the firm is understated. Second, the limited number of longitudinal studies mean that the underlying dynamic nature of divestment over time is not well theorised. Over the period that a firm has been operating in a market, the contextual conditions evolve, for instance in terms of the economic setting, socio-political policy responses and the nature of local competition. These changing dynamics add complexity to the internationalisation process and determine priorities and strategic actions reflected in investment decisions and managerial commitment.
Addressing these two gaps provides our theoretical contribution to the current understanding of the retail divestment process.
Approach and Methodology
A common theme throughout the June 2011 special issue of the Journal of International Business Studies was the importance of understanding the broader context to corporate decision making, thereby drawing on Sayer's (1992) contention that "making sense of events requires that we 'contextualize' them in some way". Welch et al (2011) pointed to the tensions between context and 'robust' scientific explanation, and make the case for contextual explanation -recognising that explanations require an understanding of the conditions under which they operate and emerge as they are placed within social time and social space. In the same issue, Burgelman (2011) also argued the case for longitudinal research to bridge the gap between descriptive historical narratives which focus on case studies of particular, experiential, social phenomenon and quantitative reductionist models which seek to develop abstract models for testing. These perspectives underpin our research design and approach.
By examining divestment actions over a thirty year period within a single industrial sector we provide a longitudinal study of the contextual pressures for divestment and how these pressures persist, combine and diminish over time. This approach allows us to explore the gaps we have identified in the literature. The choice of a single sector (grocery retailing) and region (East Asia) provides "case" boundaries for the study, allowing a highly visible and numerically manageable set of actions to be observed and analysed. Primary research into divestment has its challenges as it carries an implicit stigma. Divestments are often wiped from corporate memory, rarely featuring in company literature, and management teams and those involved in the decisionmaking process "move on". Even if individuals can be contacted their recollections or rationales for past decisions can be retro-fitted to suit post-event re-evaluations, rather than provide accounts of decisions and contextual pressures at the time.
Consequently, the interpretations presented in this paper are based upon contemporary narratives reported in secondary sources, primarily published company documents and press reports issued during the period under consideration. Data is also drawn from the retail trade press and retail-related newsfeed services over the period. Additionally, we draw on the wider academic literature on retailing and retail internationalisation in the East Asian region.
As most of the European retailers involved are publicly quoted the authors hold copies of Annual Reports for these companies throughout the whole study period. Relevant press releases and other company communications relating to strategy and operational decisions also exist to supplement this material. From this material divestment activities in the region were identified along with the contemporary commentary on these actions. These are summarised in tables 1-3.
The authors independently assessed this material and identified common themes and rationales within the narratives. These themes were then used to determine the key pressures and categorise the dominant divestment pressures alongside the focus and motives for divestment from the perspective of the individual firm. From this inductive process, three relatively distinct and coherent phases of divestment were derived (as presented in table 4) and are used to frame the presentation of the empirical analysis that follows.
Findings
The operational involvement of European grocery retailers in the major markets of East Asia presents a familiar fluid and discontinuous pattern of multiple market entries by several retailers across the region, an approach often labelled 'flag planting', followed by a period of consolidation leading to a reduction in the number of operators per market. Report, 1996: 9) and Casino when entering Taiwan:
"As a major Asian economic center with a population of 24 million with a high purchasing power, Taiwan offers strong guarantees of profitability coupled with manageable levels of risk" (Casino Annual Report, 1997: 27) The explosion of interest in the late 1990s was, however, primarily fuelled by the Asian economic crisis which coincided with a period when European retailers were cash rich (Wrigley, 2000) . Asian partners needed to raise capital or reduce commitments and moved into joint venture deals with European partners, as illustrated by Ahold, Casino and Delhaize in Thailand (Tosonboon, 2003) and Tesco in South Korea (Suh & Howard, 2009 
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In general terms, the spread of markets, drivers for involvement and entry methods employed by European grocery retailers in East Asia over the past 30 years reflect the factors and patterns commonly observed in the general retail internationalisation literature. Also clearly evident is the importance of serendipity during the regional financial crisis of the late 1990s. Over time, however, there has been a rationalisation of market presence, often after a substantial period of trading in the market, and typically through disposal of operations to local or regional players. This overall macro perspective, however, disguises the degree of variety found within the divestment process over time from which three relatively distinct phases can be discerned. When these three phases are explored in more detail, the dynamism of international retail divestment activity becomes more evident. These three phases appear to exhibit different characteristics and decisions can be attributed to changing contextual pressures and challenges over time. Recognition of this fluidity and the dynamic interactions involved is currently absent from theorisations of divestment in the literature.
Phase 1: Pioneer Adjustment (1998-2001)
The first divestment phase (Table 1 ) comprises eight country exits by six different companies plus the merger of Promodès with Carrefour, which saw the Continent tradename disappear as the outlets in three markets were rebranded. Most divestments in this period can be characterised as an initial re-adjustment to market entry. As withdrawals in this period followed relatively soon after entry (a mean of 2.4 years in the market), most divestments were of small scale operations in terms of store numbers except for Ahold's supermarket networks in China and Singapore which involved 40 and 14 stores respectively. Withdrawal also occurred whilst these companies were actively pursuing entry into other markets in the region, supporting an interpretation that this represented early stage adjustments to operating in distant and diverse markets:
"The Asian market is huge, diverse and far away. Setting up operations there is a long and challenging process" (Carrefour Annual Report, 1994: 18) This period, which we categorise as a "pioneer adjustment" phase, captures the initial reaction to emerging internationalisation strategies in the region. The opportunism and serendipity characterising many market entries during the regional economic crisis meant that new entrants were often faced with unexpected and under-researched consumer, competitive and legislative norms. These pressures disrupted preferred business models and posed unanticipated challenges which increased costs. With opportunities emerging elsewhere in the region, and companies keen to exploit first mover advantages, the decision to depart rather than invest resources in attempting to grow scale and compete was often the preferred option.
Attempts to grow scale quickly were often frustrated by limited acquisition opportunities, placing a focus on organic expansion. As Carrefour noted:
"rapid expansion in this part of the world depends on the availability of suitable locations, as current regulation and astronomical real estate prices hinder the full-scale development of our retailing formula" (Carrefour Annual Report, 1990: 13) Difficulties in accessing sites for large stores provided an unwelcome break on expansion, and encouraged opportunistic behaviours as chains sought to build store networks and secure dominant market positions. China provides a well-documented example of 'game playing' reactions as the market opened to foreign investment (Wang, 2009; Fels, 2009; Tacconelli & Wrigley, 2009; Chuang et al., 2011; and Zhang & Wei, 2015) . For foreign retailers the expansion process was at times seen as being painfully slow:
"from the beginning the Chinese government has been cautious, moving along with a deliberate sequence: from single-store operations to retail chains, and from joint ventures to whole foreign ownership" (Wang, 2003: 118) .
Although European grocery retailers adapted their expansion strategies to circumvent regulatory constraints, frustrations with the legal environment and the ability to Consumer Council found that seven of the twenty-two suppliers investigated admitted enforcing a minimum resale price on Carrefour (Zhen, 2007) . These actions raised the costs of operating in Hong Kong: "where our expansion was limited and would not provide the desired profitability" (Carrefour AR, 2000: 15) . Similarly, Ahold felt that during the late 1990s the Chinese government was acting as both regulator and competitor, thereby distorting competition (Palmer & Quinn, 2007) .
Early entrants also faced operational challenges from differences in how supply chains worked and in other norms of market behaviour. A common issue on entry was the local channel infrastructure which raised several challenges for the established cost structures of the European grocery chains' operating models. In most East Asian countries, the supply chain, particularly for fresh produce, operated through several layers of wholesalers and agencies. Additionally, infrastructure shortcomings meant that cool chains were underdeveloped or non-existent so stock levels had to be increased to allow for inefficient distribution systems. Investment was therefore required to guarantee supply, to improve production efficiency and ensure the quality and consistency of local fresh produce. Soon after entry into China and Thailand, for instance, Ahold had to open fresh food processing centres in Shanghai and Bangkok and throughout the region European grocery retailers invested heavily in distribution centres and hubs (Ahold Annual Report, 1997; 1998 : Delhaize Annual Report, 1998 ).
These investments required sunk costs in infrastructure that had not been anticipated at entry.
The perceived competitive advantage of the incoming retailers revolved around their ability to introduce modern retail techniques. The European grocery offer, irrespective of format, focused on competitive prices combined with 'western' quality, hygiene and service levels,but in virtually all cases we find examples of adaptations involving the widening of fresh produce ranges and attempts to replicate or compete with the atmosphere of wet markets, as illustrated by Tesco:
"we have brought to these businesses (Thailand) our high service standards and specialist skills in retailing" (Tesco Annual Report, 1999: 14) , Whilst to some extent the hypermarket adapted, the cash-and-carry and supermarket formats struggled for acceptance. Fierce competition from well-established wholesale networks supporting the fragmented small shop sector and the limitations on bulk purchases by private customers due to transport and storage constraints, hindered expansion. In the case of the supermarket, the Ahold strategy was based on the premise of turning around existing stores through European management practices but the stores acquired in China were in poor locations, too small and could not compete with hypermarkets on price or range.
Finally, during this initial divestment phase the regional economic crisis proved to be a double-edged sword; whilst generating expansion opportunities it also raised trading challenges. Recessionary pressures depressed sales to varying degrees focusing attention on prices, cost control and efficiency to maintain performance. In this economic climate, profitability was often sacrificed to maintain and grow sales. These pressures coincided with the initial post-entry phase when European retailers were seeking to invest to expand store numbers and floorspace to achieve scale. A year before their departure from China and Singapore Ahold had signalled caution: The emergence of strong domestic and regional players reflected a growing resistance to the European grocery retailers and their ways of operating. This was also evident in the re-regulation of the retail sector, primarily targeted at Western retailers and intended to protect local operators, and in resistance from within the supply chain to 'foreign' operational practices and from other stakeholders and opinion formers (Coe & Bok, 2014) .
Regulatory conditions are a major consideration in retail internationalisation, and can be an important form of protection for prevailing retailing systems and structures.
There is a significant body of academic literature by regional authors concerning the changing focus of public policy towards foreign retailers across East Asia and providing examples of regulatory change. Until the mid-1990s, with the exceptions of Hong Kong and Singapore, most retail markets in East Asia were either directly or indirectly protected from foreign entrants through regulations which controlled the nature and extent of foreign direct investment, imports and capital flows, and in some cases the opening of large stores and other operational practices (Davies, 1993) .
Formal barriers to foreign ownership in retailing were largely removed during the latter part of the 1990s as countries sought WTO membership. These moves, alongside the Asian economic crisis, stimulated market entry but disguised deeper rooted institutional challenges. As in Western markets, following vocal lobbying by local stakeholders, the regulatory focus soon switched towards attempts to mitigate the impact of large stores and 'foreign competition' on local retailers and suppliers, through land use legislation and competition laws. The long-term challenge for national governments was summed up by Mutebi (2007: 366) :
"Essentially policy makers have to balance the conflicting goals of seeking to promote trade competitiveness with defending the interests of local firms, interest-groups and consumers in the various urban environments."
In Malaysia, zoning laws were applied to large store development in 2002, limiting them to larger urban areas and prohibiting store openings within 3.5km of housing areas or city centres. Applications for new large format stores had to give two years notice, provide a local impact study, and were to be freestanding developments providing business opportunities for 'interested traders' at (unspecified) 'reasonable rates' (Mutebi, 2007 The European cash-and-carry operators in China had initially found expansion constrained by the slower liberalisation of wholesaling compared to retailing. Despite announcing plans for "speedy expansion" after entering in 1996, Metro took over three years to gain a national wholesale licence "after protracted negotiations" (Metro AG Annual Report, 1996; 1999) . A company interviewee quoted in Siebers (2011) complained that expansion was also held back by German diligence and a culture of compliance as they followed the rules "unlike the French" -a direct reference to the Resistance to the operating practices of the European grocery retailers was also evident in supply chain behaviours, often encouraged by the leading indigenous retailers. Elements of the 'lean distribution' processes underpinning the Western grocery model were difficult to replicate in most East Asian markets. Carrefour faced numerous challenges, often leading to high profile disputes with suppliers, as it attempted to introduce new ways of working. Problems arose as it attempted to replicate some of its fundamental operating principles in the Japanese market -not least maintaining control over its own merchandising and pricing (Larke, 2004) .
Dealing directly with suppliers was not feasible in Japan, where procurement, logistics and inventory were managed through a series of intermediaries who performed more retail support services such as in-store display and inventory management than was the norm in Europe. Some major Japanese food manufacturers refused to deal with Carrefour, so many leading brands were unavailable when the first store opened (Baek, 2004) , and the CEO of the largest liquor wholesaler was publicly quoted as saying he would only deal with Carrefour if the Japanese retailers AEON and ItoYokado did not object (Larke & Causton, 2005) .
The decentralisation of buying in the Carrefour business model also encouraged a range of 'informal' payments in China and Taiwan. Several staff in Beijing were arrested during 2007 for accepting bribes from suppliers and in both countries the buying process was subsequently centralised to counter these practices. Tensions arose around fees and rebate structures in China as charges for shelf slots, display and promotional activity, store cleaning and bank charges and 60-day payment terms were introduced allowing Carrefour to utilise supplier capital (Xu et al., 2014) . It was suggested by Wang (2009) that these fees replaced efficiency as a source of profit. In Taiwan, some supplier fees were imposed rather than negotiated, became on-going rather than one off charges, and covered a wider range of services and activities than was the norm (Hitoshi, 2003) . These practices placed severe pressures on supplier margins, consequently several major food manufacturers refused to supply Carrefour.
Phase 3: Reconfiguring the Global Firm (2012-2016)
The third phase of divestment from 2012-2016 entails ten departures by five companies and represents withdrawal from long-established mature businesses (Table 3 ). These operations had been active in East Asian markets for an average of 15.2 years and many of them had evolved into multi-format organisations. The scale of some of these operations is reflected in the value of the divestment transactions.
Tesco's departure from South Korea raised a headline price of £4.2 billion, Casino received €3.1billion for its Thai operation and €920m for its Vietnamese stores, whilst
Carrefour raised €525m when its Indonesian subsidiary became a franchise. As in the previous phase -except for Carrefour's two Singaporean stores which were closedthe purchasers were major local or regional market leaders. The value extracted from some of these divestments reflects growing competition between these regional companies for the store networks. Commerce Preservation Districts (CCPDs) (Cho et al., 2014; . Although ways were found to exploit loopholes in the legislation, for example to circumvent the ownership definition Tesco-Homeplus established two 49% owned subsidiaries (CVS Homeplus and the 365 Plus franchise chain) Kim and Hallsworth (2015) argue that their actions, alongside extensive lobbying when the zoning legislation was first introduced, were counter-productive as these moves were badly received by civic society in South Korea.
Increased re-regulation undoubtedly impeded performance by changing operating costs in what is essentially a high volume, low margin retail sector. The CCPD zoning law in South Korea was followed in 2012 by restrictions on Sunday trading by 'conglomerate owned chains' requiring them to close on the 2nd and 4th Sunday of the month (Kim & Hallsworth, 2013; . As part of the narrative associated with its departure from South Korea, Tesco complained that the introduction of these trading restrictions had a £100m impact on annual profits.
Changes in senior management -often (although not exclusively) triggered by investor concerns over performance and financial returns -can have a direct bearing on divestment processes. The arrival of a new CEO or senior management team is typically followed by a strategic review of the business. New senior teams are unencumbered by loyalty to decisions made by the previous management, so a refocusing of activities or territories is common. In Japan, a joint venture was created with AEON for a nominal sum before a further 
Discussion and Conclusion
Three decades ago East Asia was the latest geographical focus for Europe's major grocery retailers. The search for emerging markets, characterised by limited local competition (in terms of 'modern' retailing) and the opportunity for first mover advantages, provided an irresistible pull for Europe's internationally expanding and cash-rich grocery chains. The removal of restrictions on FDI and the growth opportunities arising from the late 1990s regional economic crisis created attractions which outweighed the challenges of trading in such culturally distant and diverse markets. The competitive advantage pursued by European grocery retailers resided in the belief that existing business models and ways of operating could be transferred, and these business processes would then allow them to out-perform indigenous retailers. This initial optimism seems to have dissipated over the years as most of these retailers have now retrenched and divested from individual markets and even exited the region.
East Asia provides examples of most of the rationales for, and forms of, divestment discussed in the existing literature. These retail divestment frameworks and the associated empirical support are, however, generally static, focusing on a specific divestment incident or group of divestments relating to an identified trigger. In reality the retail internationalisation process is highly dynamic, punctuated by periods of retrenchment irrespective of experience, market spread, or length of time in and familiarity with a host market. Our aim in this paper was to examine this divestment process over a substantial period of time to shift the focus from individual divestment incidents and triggers to explore longer term trends and the dynamic interactions between contextualised pressures.
From our analysis of European grocery retail involvement in East Asia since the late 1980s, we contend that divestment is stimulated by and reflects different inter-related contextual considerations and pressures over time.
The importance of contextualisation, institutionalisation and embeddedness has been recognised in internationalisation research on market entry and expansion, but these considerations are less evident in divestment research. Whilst some challenges are present throughout the period, the relative importance of specific pressures is heightened, the combination of pressures varies and the interactions between pressures is intensified at different times. Consideration of this dynamism has been largely absent from existing frameworks and represents our theoretical contribution to the divestment debate.
Within East Asia three broad phases can be identified from our analysis during which particular factors or combinations of factors appear to dominate. These differences illustrate the value of longitudinal studies in exploring the changing context of decision making in international business. The first 'pioneer adjustment' divestment phase, within a few years of market entry, was characterised by frustrations over an inability to take advantage of first mover advantages and rapidly grow scale in some markets.
The expediency that encouraged market entry across several territories due to the regional economic crisis may have compromised due diligence. Unforeseen costs and complications in accessing sites and real estate, alongside deficiencies in prevailing channel infrastructures undermined the initial competitive advantages which the European grocery retailers expected to exploit. Institutional differences within East
Asian markets both constrained the ability of European grocery retailers to expand rapidly and required additional investment: rapid expansion was compromised by real estate costs and existing regulatory processes; large store formats needed to be physically reconfigured to 'fit' local urban environments and consumer behaviours; and investment was required to build "basic" channel infrastructure. Consequently, the potential to rapidly exploit first mover advantages in these markets was constrained as costs rose and economic conditions depressed sales growth whilst retailers were attempting to build store networks. Frustrations were commonly expressed in contemporary narratives over unexpected investment requirements, the pace of expansion and financial returns on investment. Decisions were therefore taken to withdraw from some markets while sunk costs (in stores and infrastructure) were relatively low.
During the second 'resistance and market consolidation' phase of divestment, which involved more established businesses usually several years old, both direct and institutionally embedded forms of resistance to European grocery retailers generated barriers to expansion. After a period of deregulation, primarily to allow FDI and attract inward investment -although often stimulated by the "bigger prize" of WTO membership -re-regulation (Nguyen et al., 2014 ) became a constant theme across East Asia. This typically involved restrictions upon large store operators and modern forms of retailing under the rhetoric of maintaining "fair" competition and protecting indigenous businesses. Suppliers also resisted aspects of Western supply chain processes and practices requiring changes to roles and responsibilities, terms and conditions, and payments within the chain. In this environment, opinion formers, such as the press, tended to present incoming retailers in a less favourable light, and such resistance was often encouraged by the leading incumbent local and regional retailers.
The emergence of local domestic or regional competitors who appropriated key elements of the Western retailers' approach, and harnessed these to their local knowledge, connections and relationships, was also a feature of this divestment phase as many of these operators acquired the assets of the departing European grocery retailers. This resistance, whether overt or tacit, changed the nature of competition at the country level and refocused attention on the wider regional market. Typically, the outcome was a market "shake out" as consolidation took place and the stated rationale for exit during this period was often framed in terms of under-performance and the inability to expand with sufficient pace to build scale or market share alongside the increased investment needed to rectify this. There is evidence of a threefold pattern of initial readjustment, market consolidation, and market maturity types of divestment over this period and a shift in territorial focus within firm decision making from the local to the regional and the global. The nature of divestment, the intersecting combination of drivers, and the outcomes of divestment are different in each of these periods. Such variety, variation and dynamism needs to be incorporated into future studies of international investment and divestment. Coping with Existing Regulations  interaction with existing systems  delays in expansion  engagement in game playing (Re)emergence of Local Competition  influence with local stakeholders (press, suppliers, political)  stronger local competition  'buy back' of assets and shareholdings Re-Regulation Activities  controls over smaller stores  controls over competitive \operating processes
Focus and Outcomes
Local Market Refinement  additional sunk costs and delays  unable to achieve expected first mover advantages as quickly as desired  invest elsewhere in region Regional Market Consolidation  resistance impacting on business model, unable to maximise efficiencies  regional (key) market concentration rather than market spreading Global Market Rationalisation  corporate returns on investment  cashing in on asset sales  focus on wider firm not individual markets or regions  divest perceived 'peripheral' activities
